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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 11-1856 
______________ 
 
ERRICK PHILLIPS, 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TONY ALSLEBEN; KEVIN KENNEDY, DEPUTY 
ERIC KESTER; CRAIG KOPPEL; TONY SUBE; 
CHRIS GABELLINI 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 08-cv-01388) 
Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 20, 2011) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from a final judgment entered on 
March 7, 2011, in the District Court following a non-jury trial in this civil rights action 
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law.  The case arose out of the arrest on 
October 23, 2006, in Allentown, Pennsylvania, of plaintiff-appellant Errick Phillips who 
allegedly suffered injuries inflicted during the arrest.   The defendant-appellees are 
officers of the office of the county sheriff and the local Allentown police department who 
arrested Phillips.  We do not set forth a factual description of the circumstances of the 
arrest as the description would be of limited importance on this appeal because, as we 
will explain, Phillips does not challenge the result at the trial.  What is significant, 
however, is that when Phillips filed his complaint on May 6, 2008, he did not ask for a 
jury trial as he could have done under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), and when 
the defendants filed their answers they did not do so either.  On April 6, 2009, long after 
the time for asking for a jury trial as a matter of right had expired, Phillips filed a motion 
seeking such a trial.  The District Court denied the motion on July 15, 2009, and, 
accordingly, it later tried the case without a jury.  At that trial the Court found in favor of 
defendants and entered judgment accordingly.  Phillips then appealed.   
On this appeal, Phillips contends only that the District Court abused its discretion 
in denying his motion seeking a jury trial.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the order of July 15, 2009, for an abuse of discretion.  See United States Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 The District Court’s explanation for denying Phillips’ motion in its entirety reads: 
The plaintiff’s request for a jury trial is denied.  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 38 clearly states that the demand for a jury must be made in 
writing ‘at any time after the commencement of the action and not later 
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than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to the issue.’  
Failure to make a timely demand constitutes a waiver by that party.  Fed. R. 
Civ. Pro. 38(d).  The deadline for that request passed long before the 
motion for summary judgment was filed. 
 
App. at 3. 
  
 Though a district court has discretion when ruling on a motion seeking a jury trial 
out of time, courts are not without guideposts in ruling on such motions as we have listed 
factors for them to consider when exercising that discretion.  Infinity Group, 212 F.3d at 
195-96.  Here, the language that the District Court used in denying Phillips’ motion leads 
us to believe that the Court may have regarded the requirement for a timely demand for a 
jury trial to be mandatory and not subject to relaxation.  We have this concern because 
the Court’s only articulated reason for denying Phillips’ motion was that his request for a 
jury was untimely.  In this regard, the Court’s reference to the motion being made after a 
motion for summary judgment had been filed mentioned a point of limited materiality on 
the jury trial issue, although a party’s delay in asking for a jury trial is a factor a court 
could consider in ruling on such a motion.1
 In view of the fact that the District Court did not indicate that it was exercising its 
discretion when it denied Phillips’ motion we considered vacating the March 7, 2011 
judgment and remanding the matter for that Court to determine now if Phillips should 
have been given a jury trial.  If we did so, then the District Court, depending upon what it 
determined, either would grant the jury trial or reinstate the March 7, 2011 judgment.  
   
                                              
1 We recognize that it is entirely possible that the District Court was well aware of the 
discretionary nature of the issue before it but nevertheless regarded the motion as 
unmeritorious.  We, however, are constrained to adjudicate the appeal on the basis of the 
record before us. 
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What we would not do, however, in remanding the case is rule that the District Court 
must grant Phillips a jury trial for we have no basis to conclude that if the District Court 
originally had exercised its discretion on Phillips’ motion and explained the reason for its 
ruling it would have granted the motion. 
 However, instead of remanding the case for the District Court to consider the jury 
trial issue we have reviewed the matter and have concluded that the Court properly 
denied Phillips’ motion.  In reaching our conclusion we point out that after the parties 
filed their last pleading the Court, on July 22, 2008, entered an order requiring that 
discovery be completed by September 19, 2008, and we reiterate that Phillips did not file 
his motion seeking a jury trial until April 6, 2009.  Consequently, he was quite dilatory in 
filing his motion.  Moreover, we are well aware that if the Court had granted Phillips’ 
motion and allowed a jury trial, defendants might have sought to reopen discovery as 
parties preparing for a jury trial sometimes take steps not taken by parties preparing for 
non-jury trials.  In the event that the Court had allowed further discovery the proceedings 
would have been delayed.  Finally, we think it unlikely that if we remanded the matter for 
the Court to consider whether Phillips should be granted a jury trial it would exercise its 
discretion to allow such a trial.  After all, it would be very unfair to defendants to require 
them to go through a second trial by reason of Phillips’ failure to ask for a jury trial in a 
timely manner. 
 The final judgment of March 7, 2011, will be affirmed. 
